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The theme of this paper is the array of legislation controlling African tenancy on 
white-owned farmland. This legislation spread from South Africa (the Cape, 1869; 
Natal, 1896; Transvaal, 1887; Orange Free State, 1893; Zimbabwe, 1908; Malawi, 
1917; Kenya, 1918). In each case, the legislation had a common purpose - to deny to 
Africans use of white-owned land, except in the capacity of labourers. In each case, 
the form the legislation took, although derived from South African practice, was 
determined by the particular constellation of forces in the political economy at the 
tine. The core of this study is an examination of the Southern Rhodesia Private 
Locations Ordinance (PLO) of 1908, and of its application. There are three levels of 
discussion. At the regional level, I have drawn on recent published and on some 
unpublished material which seems to me to be worth bringing together. At the level 
of white Rhodesian politics, I have looked in more detail at the manipulations which 
went into the making and implementation of the legislation. And at the local level, 
I have examined its implementation in one particular district, Melsetter-Chipinga, in 
the south-east of Zimbabwe. 
Labour tenancy was a relation of serfdom which emerged wherever white 
farmers with limited capital took land from agricultural peoples. It is mgued in 
this paper that in the colonial context it was inherently an unstable relation of 
production. The development of capitalism in urban, rural and mining areas tended to 
undermine all forms of tenancy, and tended to create landless proletariats, both 
urban and rural. But while an effective attack was mounted on other forms of African 
tenancy on white-owned land, white fasmers, by virtue of their disproportionate 
influence in the legislative process, were able to protect, support and continue 
artificially the relation of labour tenancy. And, whereas rent and share-cropping 
tenancy ended throw legislative action, labour tenzncy, by contrast, ended 
gradually when the development of capitalist farming made this particular form of 
labour exploitation uneconomic to the capitalist farmer, and not because of political 
or ideological reasons. Politically, tenant legislation was enacted as a compromise 
between mature and incipient forms of white capitalism at the expense of the African 
peasantry. 
The remainder of the paper is in three parts: the economic conditions of 
labour tenancy; the spread of legislation and the Southern Rhodesian PLO; and the 
ending of labour tenancy. 
I. The Economic Conditions of Labour Tenanc~ 
When white farmers took land., they also gained control of the people on it. 
This allowed them to extract surplus labour in a variety of wws. They benefited from 
invested labour in the past, in the form of cleared and cultivated land, and they were 
enabled to extract a share of the crops grown, or rent in cash, or labour directly. 
These alternatives obtained from the Cape to Kenya. Both rent tenancy and share- 
cropping occurred in the context of existing capitalist penetration and a cash 
econoq. Rent tenancy and share-cropping were practised by absentee landowners; rent 
tenancy was particularly practised by large-scale land speculators in slump periods 
when the value of their initial investment had fallen (2), whereas share-cropping was 
practised by landowners at all levels of capital accumulation, from indigent Boer 
farmers (3) to the substantial British Central Africa Company in Malawi, the only 
requirement, it seems, being that the European owner had access to a market, whether 
international, urban or local. 
Both rent tenancy and share-cropping occurred in the context of the 
development of an African peasantry. This class emerged first in the Cape in the late 
eighteenth century (4) but developed from the late 1860s, and in Natal about the same 
time, in the Boer territories from the 1880s, in Zimbabwe from the 1890s, in the Shire 
Highlands of Malawi from the first decade of this century, and in Kenya from the 
beginning of the century to the 1920s in the White Highlands, continuing later 
elsewhere. (5) The rise of the peasantry was partly a voluntary response to market 
opportunities and partly a way of meeting tax and other obligations without having to 
work directly for the colonizers. There was no necessary opposition between the rise 
of the peasantry and a section of the mercantile or financier community. (6) There 
was partial opposition between the interests of the peasantry and those of the 
capitalist sector who wished to employ wage labour, particularly if large quantities 
of unskilled labour at very low rates were required. But there was complete 
opposition between the rise of a peasantry under conditions of rent-tenancy and 
share-cropping and the interests of white farmers. As commercialization of white 
farming increased, and as land became an increasingly important factor of production 
as against labour, this opposition to an independent peasantry increased accordingly. 
Labour tenancy, however, was a relation which was strongly favoured by the 
conditions of white settle>farners, particularly in the early stages when land (for 
whites) was plentif'ul and capital was scarce. In the first few decades of farming, 
white farmers were far from using all the land they owned. This was particularly the 
case with Boers in South Africa, and when they expanded into Zimbabwe or Kenya. The 
treks of the 1890s into Zimbabwe comprised men who had little more than possessions 
in an ox-wagon, and debts at home. (7) Although from the early years of this century 
the Southern Rhodesian and Kenyan authorities made efforts to exclude the indigent 
(bywoner) element, such men often secured large farms in the early period. The 
result was labour intensive farming practices. 
Such white farmers were unwilling to pay for wage labour where they could 
avoid it. They might pay theiar transport riders and skilled workers, but for 
seasonal and unskilled labour - road-making, planting, weeding, reaping, herding, 
making irrigation channels, putting up grain stores and the like - they found it 
convenient and profitable to use labour tenants. Such pioneer farmers were 
technically and managerially unskilled and their farms were often very poorly managed. 
They were often incapable of making efficient, planned use of the services of their 
workers. Hence the convenient solution of labour tenancy, which in its primitive 
llBoerll stage bound tenants to work "when called on". The resistance of farmers in 
the Cape, in Natal, and particularly in Rhodesia, to press- to regularize their 
labour contracts by specifying the periods for which their labourers would be 
required (pressure which came both from tenants and from the urban/mining sector 
through the Native ~epartment ) illustrates this. Farmers resisted specifying labour 
terms not only from some primitive feudal urge to llownll their tenants but because of 
their managerial inefficiency. Much of their work was done on an ad hoc, piece-work 
basis. But labour which was unpaid or paid at extremely low wages was the principal 
reason for the adoption of the system. 
The preference of farmers to make their own agreements directly with 
tenants can be illustrated from the patterns which developed in Zimbabwe following 
the defeat of the 1896-7 Risings. When peace negotiations were concluded in October 
1896, the Ndebele "were starving, their lands unplanted". (8) Whites had swarmed 
into their country, pegging it off into farms. (9) The reserves which were declared 
were in no way adequate for the defeated nation. The High Conmissioner therefore 
issued a Proclamation (No. 19, 14 October 1896) to regulate the resettlement of the 
Ndebele on the land they had lost. The objects of the proclamation were presumably 
to distribute the Ndebele evenly so that their political pawer would be broken and so 
that every white farmer would be assured of a supply of resident labour after a 
period (originally two years, but the settlers and the company reduced it to o n e r  
Thus, large concentrations of people would be broken up. The Proclamation allowed 
for Native Department vetting of anwally renewable labour agreements and ensuring 
that residents had the opportunity and the land to cultivate their own crops. (10) 
Groups of less than seven families did not constitute a location and therefore did 
not come under the terms of the Proclamation. (11) 
The Southern Rhodesian administration was thus attempting to interpose, 
between the settlers and the people,administrative control to ensure a docile labour 
force and a required minimum of employer responsibility. But farmers had no wish to 
see the Native Department come between them and their tenants, and they therefore 
l~concluded agreements" with their tenants on a local basis, and not in terms of the 
Proclamation. In Matabeleland in 1907 there were only 154 official agreements, 
covering nearly 40,000 tenants, and in Mashonaland 11 agreements covering just over 
700 tenants. Even the Matabeleland agreements were admitted not to be strictly in 
terms of the Proclamation. (12) 
What kind of private "agreementsp1 did tenants have imposed on them? For 
1895, in the very earliest years of farming settlement, there is a full account of 
Melsetter District, when a meeting was held to clarify the triad of relationships 
between fanners (who had trekked into the area in the preceding two years), tenants, 
and the newly arrived Native Commissioner (Nc). One farmer paid his herdsmen a two- 
year old heifer at the end of a year, semi-skilled workers such as brick-makers five 
shillings per month, while casual labourers had to provide free labour for the 
Ikight" of living on the farm. G. B. D. Moodie, the leader of the settlers, paid 
those "who work by the monthf1; but "those who do gang work have to do it for the 
right of squatting on my fam". Another farmer testified that a certain amount of 
work, such as '%hoeing mealies", was performed for "nothing but the right of staying 
on my farm". Another divided his tenants into eight or nine g a g s ,  coming in 
rotation for a week at a time "for the right of staying on my ground". (13) 
What compelled the tenants to remain under such circumstances? First, the 
fact that farmers had chosen already populated land (14) ; then, also, because almost 
all the attractive farming land was q~ckly earmarked for.European occupation, and 
what was left over, subsequently to become reserves, was dry, with poor soil. But, 
even so, many farmers found that their tenants resisted, either by refusing to work 
or by running away. The refusal was dealt with by a celebrated case of public 
beating which was a symbolic assertion of settler power and Native Department 
powerlessness. Sometimes it was dealt with by crude fire-power. "1 have tried every 
way to get boysf1, wrote one farmer. "I have been obliged to fire on 2 of them, but 
not with the intention of shooting them." (15) 
Over time, crude force became supplanted by legal and economic presswe. 
It would appear that the Masters and Servants Ordinance (5/1901, 1/1902) was not 
effective, nor was the Pass and Registration legislation (16/1901, 10/1902, 11/1902, 
12/1904) where vague agreements such as those above were in force. But large areas 
6f land were under white control. Moreover, farmers in a certain district all tended 
to exact the same kinds of demands on their tenants, so that there was little benefit 
for a tenant in moving from one farm to another. This tended to stabilize the labour 
tenant situation. Thus, in Enkeldoorn, a heavily settled Afrikaner farming area in 
the Midlands, the commonest rate was 10/- per month, or one month's labour; in 
Salisbury, £l rent or four months1s work at 10/- per month; in Umtali, £1 rent, 
rebated to 10/- if the tenant worked "when called upon"; in South Mazoe, another 
heavily famed area north of Salisbury, 3 months at 10/- per month. (16) By this 
stage, in Melsetter the unpaid ttagreementslt had been replaced with a wage of 5/- per 
month for three months or payment of the £1 tax in lieu. (17) 
The first stage of labour tenancy can therefore be characterized as that of 
farmers, resistance to state interference t h r o w  legislation. Informal agreements 
were possible because the competition from urban and mining sectors was not so great 
as to deprive farmers of their labour tenants. Conflicting interests could be 
resolved by compromise. For example, in 1906 the Matobo (Matabeleland) branch of the 
Rhodesian Land Owners' and Farmers, Association (RLOFA) failed in its attempt to 
transfer the issue of urban passes from the NC to the farmer himself. Instead, 
farmers were allowed to endorse passes so that before an NC allowed an African to go 
to town to seek work he could be sure that the labour tenancy obligations had been 
fulfilled. 
11. The Pressure for Legislation 
Legislation does not mirror a working system. It is created when a system 
begins to break down. It reflects the interests of the powerful, and where these 
interests are divided, legislation may well emerge as confused, inconsistent and 
ineffective. The horse was created by God, but the camel was designed by a committee. 
The 1908 PLO was a camel. 
But, before we look at the legislation itself, we must examine the 
conditions which led to its being considered necessary. It appears that these 
conditions developed first in the Cape, and as they spread north through South Africa 
to Zimbabwe, Malawi and Kenya, Cape legislation became a model to be adapted to local 
conditions. Four conditions were necessary and sufficient. The first was the 
penetration of finance capital into land, leading to the accumulation of large 
estates for the purpose of speculation, and hence also to the rise of rent tenancy 
and share-cropping. The second was severe labour competition from mines and urban 
areas. The third was a differentiation of capitalization within white farming, with 
the more highly capitalized farmers becoming particularly hostile both to the casual 
labour tenancy agreements and to the rentier landlords. The less capitalized 
farmers, still depending on labour tenancy, were forced to accept State regulation 
of their feudal relations of production. It was from this hi&ly capitalized group 
that the vociferous ideological attack on "squattingtt and "Kaf fir farmingt1 came. 
These were pejorative and emotional terms, used to attack rentier landlord and share- 
cropping interests, and from the Cape to Nairobi the rhetoric was remarkable for its 
similarity. ltSquatterslt were people resident on the land of other white landowners 
(onets own residents were "boyst1). They were a danger and a nuisance, and a damage 
to the econoq. llKaffir farmerst1 were those rentier interests who profited from 
them. They were parasitic on the community. The rhetoric was an attack directed at 
African access to land as a means of production, at the African peasantry. The final 
condition necessary for legislation was that this voice should have effective politic51 
power to translate its ideology into legislation. 
There is not space here to discuss the spread, differentiation and frequent 
amendment of legislation from the Cape to Natal, the Transvaal, the Orange M e  
State, Zimbabwe, lklawi, and Kenya. (1t was considered in Zambia, but there the 
settler voice was too weak to stand up to labour demands from the south.) But the 
patterns show a remarkable similarity. The 190F1905 South African Native Affairs 
Commission saw only two solutions to the ttproblemtt of Africans on land which had been 
taken by whites: to regulate their occupation, or to remove them. (19) Throughout 
each of the territories discussed, first one and then the other was done. Except for 
a brief period in Malawi, and to a limited extent, there was no third option of 
tenant protection. 
We may now place the PLO of 1908 in this wide perspective. In the 
standard History of Southern Rhodesia, Gann discusses the Native Department's concern 
over rackrenting and suggests, by continuing immediately with the statement that "the 
Government passed an ordinance which did away with the worst abuses" (20), that the 
PLO was a piece of reforming legislation initiated by the concern of the Native 
Department for the welfare of the tenants. An examination of the detailed evidence 
indicates that this view is false. It was a political victory - and a major one - 
for settler farmers against speculative finance capital, on the one hand, and the 
African peasantry, on the other. 
The Chief Native Commissioner (CNC) did indeed draw the attention of the 
Administrator to the connection between rackrenting and the Natal disturbances of 
1906, and the CNC Mashonaland agreed on the need for compulsory legislation. But a 
survey of opinion among Matabeleland NCs revealed wide differences of opinion. One 
extreme stressed the "landlord's liberty to exact anything he likes". The other 
stressed the dominant contribution tenants were making to the colonial revenue and 
econoqy and argued for the maximum protection of their interests. In the face of 
such diversity of opinion, the Administration thought that there was no good reason 
to proceed with the proposed legislation. (21) 
Later in 1907, however, the Hi& Commissioner inquired about reports of 
tenant discontent over hi& rents in Inyanga, and the Administrator was able to reply 
that legislation controlling tenancy was under consideration. (22) What had caused 
the Administration to change its earlier view that legislation was not necessary? 
The answer is that the voice of the settlers at a time when white farming was becoming 
a major concern was much less easy to ignore than the voice of the CNCs. When the 
British South Africa Company directors visited Rhodesia in 1907, they received a 
deputation from RLOFA which called for legislation to restrict African occupation of 
white farms. This, far more than the protection of tenant interests by definite 
contracts, was what the Administration was prepared to consider. (23) The 
Administration therefore undertook to give favourable consideration to a Private 
Locations Ordinance. The Ordinance which was finally passed in 1908 was significantly 
different from the proposed Bill. An examination of the process of the actual framing 
of the final ordinance reveals the extent to which the white settlers got their own 
way. The Native Deparknent did indeed include men, particularly the two CNCs, of a 
certain stern humanitarian sympathy with the "condition of the Natives", and they 
hoped to be able to intervene in and regulate landlord-tenant regulations. As a 
relatively autonomous department, coming directly under the Administrator, they were 
entitled to be consulted about legislation affecting the African population. The 
Colonial Office, too, had its watch-dog. But events showed that it was the settler 
view which prevailed on almost every count. 
The Bill repealed the Hi& Commissionerls Proclamation of 1896. Its 
original drafting provided for three things. First, under Section 2, the Administrator 
had complete control of the conditions under which Africans resided on white 
farms, except where they were in continuous employment. The PLO applied to all 
tenants, whether the landowners were occupierfanners or "Kaffir-fanners". Second, 
there were fairly wide powers for the Native Department in ensuring clear and secure 
terms of tenancy, under agreements which were compulsory, witnessed by the local NC, 
and enforceable with penalties against both parties. The NC had to satisfy himself 
that the tenants had sufficient land and that they understood the terms. He had 
right of entry to the location. There were safeguards against sudden or arbitrary 
eviction. Third, there was a deterrent to leasing land for rent, by a differential 
fee: l/- per tenant for an tloccupiedll farm and 5/- per tenant for absentee 
landlords. There were penalties for exceeding the maximum size of location, which 
was 40 male adults per 1500 morgen (about 3000 acres). (24) 
The Bill embodied the views of the CNCs, and was an administrative 
compromise between their views and those of the settler fanners who wished simply 
to attack rentier landlords and the peasantry. When the Administrator forwarded the 
Bill to the Hi& Commissioner for comments, he remarked rather misleadingly that the 
views of the Bulamyo farmers were "endorsed by the Chief Native Commissioners". (25) 
But subsequent events showed that the settlers had quite different ideas in mind. 
The rentier landlords objected to the Bill, too, and protested vehemently 
that there was no need for legislation at all. By threatening evictions, they held 
up the implementation of the PLO until 1910. But they were unable, lacking an 
effective political voice, to alter the PLO or to prevent its passage. (26) 
The elected settler representatives in the Legislative Council, however, 
soon got their teeth into the Bill, and worried at it until it emerged a very mangled 
Ordinance. Almost every clause which gave the Native Department an interest in the 
Bill was removed. Their power to ensure that tenants had sufficient arable land was 
removed on the grounds that they were "@l;oing too far in the so called protection of 
the native". Tenants' protection from sudden or arbitrary eviction was deleted. 
Instead, the Administrator was empowered to evict people considered "undesirable" by 
neighbouring farmers. Labour tenancy,originally to come under the Ordinance, was 
excluded, by altering a provision which had originally excluded only tenants in 
"continuous" employment. Under the Ordinance as passed, Section 2 excluded from the 
definition any tenants who were in employment, continuous or not. (27) Finally, the 
settler representatives, anxious to secure as large a potential supply of labour as 
possible, altered the original intention of the Bill, which had been to prohibit 
locations of more than 40 people. Under a new Section 13, which they inserted, the 
Administrator could permit locations of any size "provided no burden is imposed on 
such natives in respect of such residence, either by way of payment of rent, supply 
of labour below the ordinary rate of wage, or otherwisef1. (28) This last provision 
let the Administration off an uncomfortable hook, because they were spared the 
necessity of facing large-scale evictions and finding land on which to settle people 
so evicted, and so they concurred. 
The wording of the Ordinance was now unclear, because many farmers who had 
labour tenants did indeed impose a burden on them by requiring unpaid labour as a 
condition of tenancy. Were they exempt from the Ordinance, as was stated in Section 
2? Or were they subject to the Ordinance, thereby having to register their tenants 
in agreements under the supervision of the Native Department, as implied in Section 
13? The Attorney General and the Resident Commissioner, watch-dog of Imperial 
interests, both noted the inconsistency, but the Ordinance was allowed to stand in 
its confused state. It was finally promulgated in 1910, after the Colonial Office 
was convinced that widespread evictions and hardship to tenants would not result. (29) 
Over the next twenty years the Native Department engaged in a battle with 
settler farmers and with the Administration in its attempt to ensure that tenants 
resident on white-owned land who paid rent, or who were labour tenants, were on 
terms which were written, and understood. They were aided by an opinion of the 
Attorney General, who ruled that in order to be exempt from the PLO a farmer should 
have his tenants "at a fixed rate of wages and for a fixed . . . period [and] the 
labourer should have the right of having his services accepted and paid for during 
that period". (30) They had little trouble in Matabeleland, where commercial 
capitalized farming was more developed and farmers were willing to accept such terms. 
But the Melsetter farmers, in a remoter area of the country and in a much more 
primitive stage of capital accumulation, held staunchly to their local practices and 
signed agreements with their tenants under increasing protest. Their protests were 
upheld by a reversal of the Attorney Generalts earlier opinion, and the Administrator 
ruled that local (settler) custom should be observed. If the tenants did not like 
it, they could move elsewhere. Since moving elsewhere involved moving on to 
unattractive, overcrowded and arid land, the tenants by and large were forced to 
like it. Thus, Melsetter was exempt from the PLO. (32) 
The Native Department did not give up its attempts. In 1915 a new 
Assistant NC came to Melsetter, a man with some humanitarian sympathy for the position 
of tenants in the District, and he managed to gain the support of the CNC in an 
attempt to bring the District under the PLO. He wanted to force the local farmers 
to engage their tenants for three months! continuous service at paid rates. This 
would certainly have been popular with the tenants, as they would have been able to 
earn wages elsewhere without losing their homes and gardens. (33) But the Attorney 
General was adamant that the Ordinance was not to be used for the protection of 
tenants in this way, and the Administrator, Chaplin, concmd. (34) 
The Native Department did not give up its fight to use the PLO as an 
instrument to improve the lot of the labour tenant. In 1921 the Melsetter Native 
Department tried to prosecute a farmer in a test case of their power to enforce the 
PLO, but the Attorney General declined to prosecute. (35) From 1927 the Dmtali 
Native Department, just to the north, developed a similar concern, arnd succeeded in 
bringing a farmer to court under the PLO for failure to pay adequate wages. In 1931 
the conviction was sustained, shnd the Native Department had finally gained the power 
to use the PLO as an instrument of reform. (36) It was one year too late. In 1930 
the Land Apportionment Act had abolished the PLO agreements. 
111. The Ending of Labour Tenancy 
The attack on rent tenancy and share-cropping had been an ideological one, 
using legislation as an instrument of control. In contrast, the ending of labour 
tenancy was piecemeal, and came about through economic pressures. The pressures were 
due to increased capitalization of farming and diversification at a time when labour 
was becoming dearer, land more valuable, and capital easier to obtain throw 
subsidies and loam and the involvement of the state in marketing operations. Under 
these circumstances, there was pressure to increase the burdens on the labour tenants, 
to move towards a system of full-time wage labour, and to develop a rural proletariat. 
Thus in South Africa, Zimbabwe and Kenya, particularly from the 1930s, there were 
increased pressures towards the eviction of tenants. It seems to me to be 
inappropriate to characterize this process, where it was legislated, as one of 
reform, which is how Pachai sees the Malawi legislation of 1952 and 1954. (37) As 
A. S. P. Taylor has remarked appositely in another context, it was not so much a 
matter of freeing the serfs from the land as of freeing the land of the serfs. 
The Land Apportionment Act (LAA) of 1930 in Zimbabwe shows the extent to 
which the balance of power had moved to the side of the farmer and against the tenant. 
Under the LAA, labour agreements could still be made between landholder and tenant, 
but since the main aim of the Act was to end African occupation of what was declared 
European land, the element of tenant protection was withdrawn. While the Native 
Department was trying, with little success, to use the PLO for its aims, the settler- 
farmers were trying to use it for their ends. The success with which they did so is 
vividly illustrated in Melsetter. After the First World War, farmers had overcome 
their initial doubts about the PLO and had begun to see in it a way of preventing 
the migration of their tenants to the mines. They therefore came under it, one by 
one and voluntarily, while resisting any attempt to enforce it on them against their 
will. (38) In 1924 the Eastern Districts representative in the Legislative Assembly 
successfully proposed an amendment to the PLO which would make the tenantls non- 
fulfilment of his labour agreement a punishable offence. (39) The Native Department 
forced an administrative compromise whereby labour agreements were endorsed on the 
Registration Certificate, making the holder liable to penalties under the Ivlasters and 
Servants Ordinance. (40) 
The coming of the LAA of 1930 brought little c h & e  to the Melsetter 
situation. Under it, Melsetter farmers were given the special concession of being 
allowed to retain their tenants under labour agreements which were subject to the 
approval of the new Land Board, under the chairmanship of the CNC, then Col. Carbutt. 
Carbuttfs instinctive reaction, despite his crusty conservatism, was to object to all 
vague agreements where the tenants had to work for the landholder without pay, on the 
grounds that it would "impoverisht1 the tenants. But when he discovered how widespread 
the agreements were, and that forcing farmers to pay wages would result in the 
eviction of tenants to the "torrid lands of the Native Purchase area and the Native 
Reserves", he quickly gave way, approved all the Melsetter agreements, and confirmed 
the tenants in their unenviable position. (41) 
Melsetterls ten-year period of grace elapsed in 1941, and the revised LAA 
brought all labour agreements under Government approval and annual review. The 
Eastern Districts Legislative Assembly representative obtained an amendment deleting 
a minimum wage proposal for the post-1941 Agreements. (42) Thus, when the Native 
Department found itself w i t h  formal, legal control over the agreements in 1941, it 
was control without teeth, because there were no standards specified of what kinds 
of agreement were acceptable. In any case, within a few years, the post-war boom 
brought considerable prosperity to white farming, and with it the increasing 
employment of labourers from Mozambique and l!'Ialawi. Thus, for thirty years, the 
chief effect of the PLO in the District was as a legislative aid to poor white 
farmers, to secure them a docile labour supply at their own convenience. 
l The PLO was not, and never was intended to be, an instrument of reform. 
I The fate of the attempts of the Native Department to use it as such bear ample 
witness to that conclusion. As elsewhere, it was the product of the rise of 
I commercial farming. It was a victory for local capitalist interests over finance 
I capital and speculative landholding. It was a move to provide an increased labour 
l supply by attacking the basis of African peasantry, and it became transformed into 
an act to enforce labour tenancy at a time when it would otherwise have begun to 
dissolve away. It was an essential element in the primitive accumulation of capital 
by settler farmers. 
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